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Ross P Cameron 
University of Leeds 
 
Forthcoming in Noûs 
 
1: The Problem of Negative Facts 
 
When there is truth, there must be some thing to account for that truth: some thing 
that couldn’t exist and the true proposition fail to be true.  That is the truthmaker 
principle.  True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently 
existing external world. 
 
The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have 
wanted to weaken it and accept not that every true proposition has a truthmaker but 
only that some important class of propositions require truthmakers.1 
 
Let us, following Armstrong, call the claim that all true propositions, without 
exception, have a truthmaker, Truthmaker Maximalism.  Why might one be tempted 
to the spirit of truthmaker theory but reject Truthmaker Maximalism?  Well, you 
might deny that necessary truths need truthmakers, for one, and insist that only 
contingent truths have truthmakers.  But I think it’s fair to say that the most common 
motivation for rejecting maximalism concerns negative truths. 
 
The thought that negative truths are exempt from the demand for truthmakers could 
be justified in one of two ways: there is the claim that we don’t need truthmakers for 
negative truths, and there is the claim that we can’t have truthmakers for negative 
truths.  The idea behind the first of these claims is that once we have made true the 
positive truths we get the negative truths for free, and so to demand additional 
truthmakers for negative truths would be a violation of Ockham’s razor.  The idea 
behind the second claim is that all the options for truthmakers for negative truths are 
rebarbative, and have no place in a safe and sane ontology; hence we should exempt 
negative truths from the truthmaker principle lest we commit an ontological sin.  
Let’s consider these claims in order. 
 
A prominent defender of the claim that we don’t need truthmakers for negative truths 
is Hugh Mellor (2003).  Mellor says2 
 
Some . . . truths need no truthmakers, notably true truth-functions, 
whose truth follows from the truth values of their constituents.  We 
may say of course that ‘P&Q’ and ‘PVQ’ are “made true” by the 
truth of ‘P’ and ‘Q’; but this is just the entailment of one proposition 
by others, not the “cross-categorical” link between propositions and 
other entities that concerns us here.  That is what true truth-functions 
do not need and therefore, I claim, do not have. . . In particular, 
negative propositions do not need them, since if ‘P’ is made true by 
                                                 
1 See, inter alia, Simons (2005), Mumford (2005), and Mellor (2003). 
2 Mellor (2003, p213) 
S, all it takes to make ‘P’ false and hence ‘¬P’ true is that S not 
exist. 
 
But this isn’t very convincing.  It’s not unreasonable to think that no further 
truthmaker is needed for a conjunction than the truthmakers for each of its conjuncts, 
or that once you make a proposition true you thereby make true any disjunction of 
which that proposition is a disjunct; but the case of negation looks quite different.  In 
the conjunction and disjunction case we have the sense of truthmaking transmitting 
across entailment: we don’t need a further truthmaker for p because we have a 
truthmaker for q, and q entails p.3  This is missing from the case of negation.  If we 
don’t have a truthmaker for ¬p then we don’t have a truthmaker for any proposition 
that entails ¬p either: it’s not as if truthmakers for ¬¬¬P are any easier to find than 
truthmakers for ¬P! 
 
Mellor says that “if ‘P’ is made true by S, all it takes to make ‘P’ false and hence 
‘¬P’ true is that S not exist”.  But that’s not right.  A proposition can have more than 
one possible truthmaker.  S, the actual truthmaker for P, might not exist and P still be 
true because something else other than S makes it true.  To guarantee that P is false, 
and hence that ¬P is true, we need to ensure that there is nothing that is a truthmaker 
for P.  But that’s just another negative existential.  So we can argue that the only 
problem with negative truths is the problem of negative existentials – since to account 
for the truth of ¬P we need only point to the truthmaker for <there is no truthmaker 
for P> – but we can’t claim that there is no problem with negative truth at all.  We’ve 
been given no reason to think we don’t need a truthmaker for the negative existential 
which says that the positive proposition P lacks a truthmaker. 
 
The thought that we don’t need truthmakers for negative truths doesn’t seem much of 
a runner.  But if that’s right then the thought that we can’t have truthmakers for 
negative truths looks very serious indeed; for if true it would seem to motivate 
abandoning not just truthmaker maximalism, but truthmaker theory altogether.  If we 
don’t get the negative truths for free given the positive truths, then what possible 
motivation could there be for accepting that some truths require truthmakers but that 
negative truths don’t?  That would be to accept that the negative truths are not true in 
virtue of anything: but if we allow that then why do we not allow positive truths that 
are not true in virtue of anything?  It’s one thing to say that certain truths are obtained 
for free given our grounding of other truths, and hence that they don’t need a further 
grounding; it’s another thing altogether to say that certain truths just aren’t grounded.  
Either there’s something wrong with accepting truths that don’t have an ontological 
grounding or there isn’t: if there is, then every truth requires a grounding; if there 
isn’t, then no truth requires a grounding.   
 
Truthmaker theory is a theory about what it is for a proposition to be true; it’s just not 
the kind of theory that can apply only in a restricted domain.  What possible reason 
could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in 
what there is that doesn’t apply to all propositions?  Why should it be okay for 
negative truths to go ungrounded and not okay for positive truths to go ungrounded?  
And if negative truths don’t have truthmakers then make no mistake: they are 
ungrounded.  It is no good to say that they are grounded in the lack of a truthmaker 
                                                 
3 Armstrong defends the claim that truthmaking distributes across entailment in his (2003). 
for the positive truth that is their negation.  Unless we reify this absence of a 
truthmaker this is nothing but metaphysical smoke and mirrors.  It’s totally 
disingenuous to say that ¬p is true in virtue of the absence of a truthmaker for p 
unless there is some thing that is this absence.  And if there is such a thing as the 
absence then it is a truthmaker for ¬p, so maximalism is vindicated. 
 
So either truthmaker maximalism is true or we should abandon truthmaker theory 
altogether.  That these are our options is also argued for by Julian Dodd 
(forthcoming).  Dodd concludes from this that we should abandon truthmaker theory, 
on the grounds that no plausible story concerning truthmakers for negative facts is 
forthcoming.  So he moves from (1) If there are truthmakers at all, there are 
truthmakers for negative truths and (2) There are no truthmakers for negative truths to 
(3) There are no truthmakers.  I agree with (1), but would instead argue from the 
negation of (3) to the negation of (2).  There must be truthmakers for negative truths, 
given that there are truthmakers at all. 
 
Why think that we can’t have truthmakers for negative truths?  George Molnar put the 
problem thus4 (and is cited favourably by Dodd): (i) the world is everything that 
exists, (ii) everything that exists is positive, therefore (iii) negative claims about the 
world aren’t made true by anything that exists.  The idea is that there’s no negative 
ontology and so, since negative ontology would be what made negative truths true, 
there are no truthmakers for negative truths. 
 
But what is ‘negative ontology’?  What is it for a thing to be positive or negative?  I 
have no idea.5  And as van Inwagen might have said, I don’t believe this is my fault.  
Being positive or negative seems to apply, in the first case, to representational entities 
such as propositions: <there is a donkey> is positive and <there is not a talking 
donkey> is negative because the former represents something to be the case and the 
latter represents something not to be the case.  Now you may not even like the 
distinction here (After all, doesn’t <there is a donkey> represent it not to be the case 
that there are no donkeys?  Doesn’t <there is not a talking donkey> represent, 
positively, that every donkey lacks speech?) but grant it for the sake of argument.  
Most things are not representations, so it seems that we can call them ‘positive’ or 
‘negative’ in a derivative sense at best.  So what are the rules?  Is an entity positive if 
it corresponds to a positive proposition and negative otherwise?  Well if so then I am 
not convinced by Molnar’s (ii).  (ii) would amount to the claim that nothing 
corresponds to a negative proposition; but the correspondent of a truth is just its 
truthmaker, so (ii) would simply amount to the claim that there are no truthmakers for 
negative propositions.  It can’t be relied upon, then, in an argument meant to show 
that there’s any problem in providing truthmakers for negative truths.  But if that’s 
not what it means for an entity to be negative or positive then I have no idea what it 
means.  So Molnar doesn’t seem to have provided any particular reason for thinking 
that negative truths resist truthmaking. 
 
There seems to be no problem with truthmakers for negative truths per se.  The only 
problem worth taking seriously, I think, is the intuitive dissatisfaction with the extant 
accounts of such truthmakers.  The main contenders in the literature for what makes it 
                                                 
4 Molnar (2000) 
5 I’m not alone in my ignorance.  See also Parsons (forthcoming) 
the case that, for example, there are no unicorns are (1) the absence of unicorns6, and 
(2) the totality fact that all the first-order states of affairs are all the first-order states 
of affairs.7  But both kinds of thing are just really peculiar8: and if the choice is 
between them or abandoning truthmaker theory it’s not surprising that many opt for 
the latter. 
 
I’m going to offer a new solution.  I’m going to recommend belief in an entity that 
makes all true propositions of the form <there is no X> true and whose admission into 
our ontology should not make us ashamed.  That entity is the world.  The world, I will 
argue, makes it the case that there are no unicorns, or arctic penguins, or talking 
donkeys, etc. 
 
Given truthmaker necessitarianism this commits me to the claim that the world is 
essentially lacking in unicorns, talking donkeys etc.  But what’s wrong with that?  
That doesn’t entail that there couldn’t have been such things; it only entails that 
worlds which contain such things wouldn’t have been counterparts9 of the actual 
world. 
 
From the fact that some proposition p is possible we are committed to the claim that 
there is a possible world w at which p is true; but we are not thereby committed to 
thinking that the object which is the actual world could have been like w is.  It is an 
open question whether the possible worlds which represent de dicto ways things 
could have been also represent de re of the actual world ways it might have been.  
The only counterpart of the actual world might be itself, in which case it has all its 
properties essentially; but that by no means entails that every truth is necessarily true: 
there are still worlds at which propositions which are in fact true are false, but they 
are not counterparts of our world. 
 
Why might one think that there can be possible worlds which are not counterparts of 
the actual world (or equivalently, why might one think that there are de dicto ways 
things might have been that are not de re ways the object which is the world might 
have been)?  Well, it seems that there is a world w which contains as a proper part a 
duplicate of the actual world, @.  (This is a world that represents the possibility of 
things going just as they in fact do, but with extra stuff going on ‘on the outside’.)  Is 
it obvious that w is the counterpart of @ at w?  The thing at w most like @ is not w 
itself but the proper part of w that is the duplicate of @, call it w-.10  One might be 
tempted to think, then, that while it is w that represents a de dicto way things could 
have been, it is w- that represents a de re way the actual world might have been. 
 
                                                 
6 As in Martin (1996) and Kukso (2006) 
7 As in Armstrong (1997) 
8 I’m not going to argue for the peculiarity of absences or totality facts here.  However I will, below, 
offer reasons for preferring my account of truthmakers for negative facts over these alternatives. 
9 Or wouldn’t have borne the relation of trans-world identity to the actual world.  I am not assuming 
the truth of counterpart theory, I merely find it a convenient way of talking.  In particular, I am 
assuming that the (Lewisian) counterpart theorist is wrong in accepting the inconstancy of modality de 
re.  I proceed on the assumption that ascriptions of essence are true or false independently of the 
context of utterance. 
10 The Lewisian counterpart theorist, of course, could hold that both w and w- are counterparts of @.  
But I will be assuming with the orthodoxy that the relation that represents identity across worlds is an 
equivalence relation. 
But once we allow that not every world is a counterpart of the actual world, what is to 
stop us holding that the only counterpart of the actual world is itself, or less 
drastically: that the only counterparts of the actual world are itself or worlds that are 
indiscernible to it, and hence that it has no counterpart at w?  After all, does it not 
sound quite natural to say that we individuate worlds by what goes on at them?  What 
makes a world w that very world and not some other world is, surely, what goes on at 
w. 
 
‘The world’ is, familiarly, ambiguous.  It can refer to the actual world, something 
concrete, or to the actualised world, something abstract.  It’s not controversial to 
suggest that possible worlds, the abstract entities, are individuated by what is true 
according to them.  If, for example, possible worlds are sets of propositions, and what 
is true according to them is a matter of what propositions are in the set, then it follows 
from the fact that sets are individuated by their members that possible worlds are 
individuated by what is true according to them.  If w and v were distinct worlds then 
there would have to be a proposition, p, that is a member of w and not v; in which 
case there is at least one proposition, namely p,that is true at w and not at v.  I am 
suggesting something further: that the concrete worlds that are said to be actual by the 
possible worlds are also individuated by what is true at them.11  So let the world that 
is said to be actual by a possible world w be W; my claim is that, for any two possible 
worlds w and v, W and V (the concrete worlds that are said to be actual by the 
possible worlds w and v respectively) are counterparts iff all and only the 
propositions that are true according to w are true according to v. 
 
I’ll say more to defend this claim shortly, but let me first note another pleasing 
consequence of accepting it.  As Lewis (2001) pointed out, the truthmaker principle 
entails that no two possible worlds have the same domain: for any two worlds, w and 
v, there exists something at w that does not exist at v, or vice-versa.  For suppose 
otherwise – suppose that all and only the entities that exist at w exist at v.  Then 
exactly the same propositions must be true at each world.  For suppose some 
proposition p was true at w and false at v.  Then something exists at w that can’t exist 
and p be false.  But since everything that exists at w exists at v it follows that p is true 
at v.  So we must reject either our assumption that there’s some proposition that is 
true at w and false at v or our assumption that w and v have the same domain.  So if 
two worlds have the same domain then the same propositions are true at each.  But 
for any two worlds, w and v, there is a proposition that is true at w and not true at v: 
namely, the proposition that w is actualised.  So there are no two worlds that have the 
same domain. 
 
That might seem surprising.  You might have thought it an open question whether or 
not there are distinct worlds with the same domains; but if Lewis is right, and he is, 
then the question is closed: if two worlds are distinct then they have different 
domains.  But if I’m right about how worlds are individuated then the pill Lewis 
forces on the truthmaker theorist is sweetened.  Of course there’s something that 
exists at w that doesn’t exist at v (and vice-versa): namely W, the concrete world that 
                                                 
11 And it’s obviously this claim that is necessary to make for my proposal to be successful.  One can’t 
claim that is the abstract possible worlds that make the negative existentials true, since all the abstract 
possible worlds actually exist. 
w represents as being actualised.12  W exists according to w but not v, and V exists 
according to v but not w.  In that case the truthmaker for <w is actualised> would, 
were w actual, be W.  But w and v might, for all I have said, be indiscernible in every 
other respect; that is, they might differ only in what world is said to exist – and that 
goes a long way to saving the intuition that there can be distinct but indiscernible 
worlds. 
 
2: World and Essence 
 
I’ve claimed that the actual world is individuated by what is true according to it.  This 
amounts to the claim that it has all its properties essentially.  As such it is a suitable 
truthmaker for true negative existentials.  No proper part of the world necessitates that 
there are no unicorns, since every proper part might have been a proper part of a 
different world that did contain unicorns; so the truthmaker, and hence the ontological 
commitment, of <there are no unicorns> is just the actual world.  (Will the world be a 
truthmaker for every true proposition?  I think not, for reasons I will give in section 
3.) 
 
Why should you believe my claim?  Well I’m just doing what the truthmaker theorist 
always does: urging you to believe in a certain entity with certain essential properties 
on the grounds that this entity is a suitable truthmaker for otherwise recalcitrant 
truths.  I’ve already argued that you should be a truthmaker maximalist if you like 
truthmaking at all.  So even if you find it unintuitive that the essential properties of 
the actual world are as I claim, you should accept this claim insofar as it is more 
plausible than the rival accounts of truthmakers for negative truths – or stop doing 
truthmaking altogether.  (I’m not trying to convince you to be a truthmaker theorist 
here: I’m trying to convince you to accept my account of negative truths if you are 
sympathetic to truthmaking.)  
 
I find the thought that the actual world has all its properties essentially far more 
plausible than the thought that there are such things as absences or totality facts, but I 
won’t rest my case solely on this intuition.  The advantage I will cite concerns the 
Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existents.13  Lewis (1999) 
famously charged truthmaker theory with violating the Humean doctrine: the 
principle that “anything can coexist with anything else . . . Likewise, anything can fail 
to coexist with anything else”.14  Consider the truthmaker for the contingent 
predication <A is red>.  It can’t be A, since A might not have been red.  So the 
truthmaker is something distinct from A, but nevertheless its existence necessitates 
the existence of A, since it necessitates the truth of <A is red>, and that can’t be true 
without A existing.  So there is a necessary connection between the distinct things, A 
and the truthmaker for <A is red>. 
 
                                                 
12 I’m not committing myself to there being a concrete world W in saying this.  I can talk of the 
concrete world that w says is actual without believing that there is such a concrete world just like I can 
talk of the concrete talking donkey that w says to be actual without believing that there is such a 
concrete talking donkey.  What I may be committed to is ersatz representations of these concrete 
objects. 
13 In what follows I draw on Cameron (forthcoming). 
14 Lewis (1986, p87-88) 
But Lewis is too quick to charge the truthmaker theorist with violation of the Humean 
doctrine.  By his own lights, the principle we are committed to is not that for any two 
things, x and y, x could exist without y existing, but that a duplicate of x could exist 
without y existing.  That will at most put a constraint on what the truthmaker for <A 
is red> could be – it won’t rule out truthmaker theory.  If, for example, the truthmaker 
for <A is red> is the trope of A’s particular redness then there seems to be no problem 
in the claim that a duplicate of this trope could exist without a duplicate of A existing. 
 
What’s relevant to the current discussion, however, is not the part of the Humean 
doctrine that says that for any two things, one might exist without the other, but the 
part that says that any two possible things might coexist.  It is that doctrine that looks 
to be violated by having truthmakers for negative truths.  For consider any 
contingently true negative existential <there are no Xs> such that, were there Xs, they 
would essentially be Xs.  If there are any such propositions – and it seems very likely 
that there are – then we have a violation of the Humean doctrine, since no possible X 
can coexist with the actual truthmaker for <there are no Xs>. 
 
So the compossibility demand of the Humean doctrine is violated by the demand for 
truthmakers for negative existentials just as the demand for independent existence is 
violated by the demand for truthmakers for contingent predications.  But just as we 
should weaken the independent existence demand to talk about duplicates, so we 
should weaken the compossibility demand.  That is, we should demand only that for 
any two possible objects, x and y, a duplicate of x could coexist with a duplicate of y.  
And, just as before, this at most puts constraints on what the truthmakers for negative 
existentials can be, it does not rule out such truthmakers altogether. 
 
And, interestingly, this doctrine apparently rules out both absences and totality facts 
as such truthmakers, but it does not rule out my account that it is the world that makes 
negative existentials true.  This is the main advantage – other than its higher degree of 
intuitive plausibility – that I claim for my account. 
 
The negative existentials that threaten to cause trouble for the revised form of the 
Humean doctrine are not ones where there could be Xs which would essentially be Xs 
but ones where there could be Xs which would intrinsically be Xs.  In that case there 
is a possible X such that any duplicate of it is also an X.  This thing had better be able 
to coexist with the actual truthmaker for <there are no Xs>, so that truthmaker had 
better have a duplicate that is not itself a truthmaker for <there are no Xs>.  So it had 
better not be intrinsic to the truthmaker for <there are no Xs> that it makes it the case 
that there are no Xs.  This is where I think I have the advantage, because while it is 
plausible that absences of Xs are intrinsically absences of Xs, and that the totality fact 
that such-and-such first-order facts are all the first-order facts is intrinsically the 
totality fact that those very first-order facts are all the first-order facts, it is not at all 
plausible that worlds are intrinsically worlds.  The world is the biggest thing.  It is a 
world because there is nothing bigger than it that it is a proper part of.  Remember the 
case earlier of the world w that had a proper part, w-, that is a duplicate of the actual 
world @.  That is precisely a case where the actual world has a duplicate that is not 
itself a world.  And while @ is the truthmaker for <there are no unicorns>, w- is not 
such a truthmaker because it is not a world.  That is why there is no problem in w- 
coexisting with unicorns.  The Humean denial of necessary connections, then, gives 
us reason to prefer my account of truthmakers for negative existentials over the main 
contenders.  That, to my mind, is sufficient reason to accept it. 
 
3: Truthmaker theory as a guide to ontology 
 
Let me turn now to a possible objection to my proposal.  If I am right, so the 
objection goes, truthmaker theory is no use as a guide to what there is.  For whenever 
there is a true proposition p, its truth will be necessitated by the existence of the 
actual world.  In that case once I have admitted the world as the truthmaker for 
negative existentials, I need not admit the existence of anything else.  But surely that 
makes a mockery of truthmaker theory?  The truthmaker theorist urges us to accept an 
ontology rich enough to ground the truth of the propositions we accept as true.  Surely 
that requires more than believing in the world!  I do not meet a truthmaker objection 
just by claiming that the world exists. 
 
Let's consider a case study.  There is supposed to be a truthmaker objection to 
nominalism: the view (at least as I will be using the term) that there are no 
properties.15  The objection is that the nominalist has no ontological grounding for 
truths of the form <a is F>.  a does not ground the truth of this proposition because, in 
most cases at least, a will be merely accidentally F.  If there is to be an ontological 
grounding for propositions such as <a is red>, the thought goes, there must be 
properties; for the only candidates, seemingly, for entities whose existence 
necessitates the truth of <a is red> are the non-transferable trope of a's redness, or the 
state of affairs of a instantiating the universal of redness.  Either there are tropes or 
there are universals, then; in any case, nominalism is false. 
 
But, so the objection goes, the truthmaker objection to nominalism is completely 
wrong headed if what I said was right, because the nominalist has available to them a 
nominalistically acceptable necessitating truthmaker for <a is red>: the world.  
Indeed, the truthmaker principle is useless as a guide to what there is; for whenever 
someone argues for the existence of X, or the Xs, on the grounds that they are needed 
to be the truthmaker for p, or some domain of truths D, her opponent can always say 
that the world does the job instead. 
 
I do not want to bite the bullet on this objection.  I want to argue that there is still, on 
my view, a truthmaker objection to nominalism.  My claim is that while the world is a 
suitable truthmaker for negative existentials it is not a suitable truthmaker for 
propositions of the form <a is F>.  So even if the nominalist accepts the existence of 
the world (and accepts that its essential properties are as I have said) they still have 
not recognised the existence of anything which is a suitable truthmaker for <a is red>. 
 
Why is the world not a suitable truthmaker for <a is F>?  Because it is not the case 
that a is F because the world which exists is the actual world; rather, it is that world 
that exists, and not some other world, because (among other things) a is F.  The 
truthmaker is meant to ground the truth of the proposition.  The proposition is true in 
virtue of the existence of the truthmaker.  But it does not sound right to say that a is F 
in virtue of the existence of the world.  That is to get things the wrong way round.  
                                                 
15 One nominalist, Josh Parsons (1999), attempts to reconcile his nominalism with truthmaker theory, 
but he does so at the expense of rejecting truthmaker necessitarianism, which I accept. 
The world being this very world depends on a being F (if a were not F, the world 
would not be the world it in fact is), not the other way round.  Why is the same not 
true of negative existentials?  Well we can't say that the world is the very world it is 
because of the absence of arctic penguins, because that gets us back into believing in 
absences, and there are no such things as absences. 
 
The idea is that the world is the very world it is in virtue of its constituents; were the 
world to be constituted differently, it would not be the very world it in fact is.  But 
while there is a constituent of a's F-ness, there is no constituent of the absence of 
arctic penguins, because there are no such things as absences.  So it's not the case that 
the world is the world it is in virtue of the non-existence of arctic penguins, because 
there is no such thing as the non-existence of arctic penguins.  Instead, it must be that 
there are no arctic penguins in virtue of the existence of the world. 
 
This yields what I think is a very pleasing picture.  For each positive truth there is a 
truthmaker – for my money, I think these truthmakers will be particularised properties 
(tropes).  None of these truthmakers is a world, but each of them partly constitutes the 
actual world.  These truthmakers together suffice for the entirety of the positive 
truths.  The world is constituted from these truthmakers, and is essentially constituted 
from just them, so that no thing which lacks one of them as a constituent, and no 
thing which has any thing else as a constituent, is a counterpart of the world.  The 
world then is the truthmaker for the negative truths.  And so given the world and the 
truthmakers which constitute the world, we have an ontological grounding for every 
truth: positive and negative. 
 
I am relying here on the thought that the nature of the whole is determined by the 
nature of the parts.  The world – the biggest entity that there is – exists, and is what it 
is, in virtue of its parts.  That’s why you have to believe in the truthmakers for the 
positive truths (the tropes) if you believe in the world: to believe in the world but not 
these truthmakers is like believing in Socrates’ singleton without believing in 
Socrates – you would believe in the dependent without believing in what it is 
dependent on, and that’s no good.  However, if you thought instead that the whole 
was prior to its parts – as in the priority monism defended by Jonathan Schaffer16 – 
then I wouldn’t have any problem with you claiming simply that the world is the 
truthmaker for every truth, positive and negative.  If you say to Schaffer, as I said 
above, that the world is the very world it is because a is red, rather than the other way 
round, Schaffer will reply: No, the existence of the world is fundamental – it being 
this world that exists and not some other is where explanation comes to an end.  So if 
the world is ontologically basic, rather than its constituents, then it is fine to let it do 
all the truthmaking, in which case you need not believe in properties.  And in fact, 
that’s exactly what Schaffer does.17 
 
That is, it’s fine given the truth of monism.  I think monism is mistake enough.  So 
I’ll be assuming henceforth that the whole is dependent on its parts – in which case I 
think it is a mistake to believe in the world without believing in the (property 
involving) truthmakers for the positive truths. 
 
                                                 
16 Schaffer (manuscript a) 
17 Schaffer (manuscript b) 
Now let us return to our wannabee nominalist truthmaker theorist.  She claims to 
believe in the entity I am calling the world, and to agree with me as to its essential 
properties, and as a result she claims to have a truthmaker for true predications 
without having to believe in properties.  My response is that she cannot in good faith 
accept the existence of the world without thereby accepting the existence of the 
particularised properties that constitute the world. 
 
Suppose someone comes up to Armstrong and says: “You've told me that the 
truthmaker for negative existentials is the totality fact. But the existence of the totality 
fact also necessitates any positive truth.  In that case I only need the totality fact; I 
don't need to believe in the first-order states of affairs that you claim are the 
truthmakers for simple predications.”  Armstrong has an easy reply: You cannot in 
good faith believe in the totality fact without believing in the first-order states of 
affairs, because the existence of the totality fact is dependent on the existence of the 
first-order states of affairs.  What it is to be that totality fact, and not some other 
totality-fact, is that it has those first-order states of affairs (all and only the actual 
first-order states of affairs) as constituents.  Were there extra first-order states of 
affairs, or less, or were some swapped for others, then there would not be that very 
same totality fact.  The first-order states of affairs are ontologically prior to the 
totality fact, so you cannot believe in the latter and deny the existence of the former. 
 
Likewise, when my nominalist opponent says to me that she can get away without 
believing in properties because she believes in the world, I reply that you cannot in 
good faith believe in the world without believing in properties.  The world is 
constituted by the truthmakers for positive truths, and in order to have truthmakers for 
the positive truths there must be properties.  It is no good to claim that the world is 
the truthmaker for the positive truths.  You only get the world if you already have the 
truthmakers for the positive truths.  The truthmakers for the positive truths are 
ontologically prior to the world – the world is constituted from these truthmakers, and 
cannot exist unless they exist – and so acceptance of the existence of the world 
already involves acceptance of the truthmakers which constitute it, and this involves 
acceptance of properties.  Thus the truthmaker objection to nominalism stands, and 
my version of truthmaker theory remains a guide as to what there is. 
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